Many recent writings in health policy have proposed that health be valued directly and in monetary terms using the new well-being valuation method. Yet there is no clear consensus on what the best measure of individual"s experience may be for the evaluation process. To shed light on this issue, monetary values for a number of health problems are compared across different well-being measures within the same UK data set. We find that, while there is strong internal consistency of health impacts within each well-being measure, hugely different monetary valuations are obtained for the same health problem across different well-being measures. Our results, although should only viewed as illustrative, call for economists to rethink about which measure of well-being or experienced utility to be used in the well-being valuation method, should the approach ever be implemented in real policy contexts.
Introduction
Many recent writings in health policy have proposed that health be valued directly and in monetary terms using the well-being valuation (WV) method. Yet there is no clear consensus within the literature on what the best measure of individual"s experience may be for the evaluation process.
Our paper explores whether different measures of well-being produce similar monetary values of the same health condition. We present econometric evidence that the monetary values of the same health condition vary substantially across different well-being measures within the given data set. Our results suggest that economists may need to consider these differences in the monetary values of the same health condition before the well-being valuation method can be taken seriously in health, as well as in public policy.
More specifically, this paper documents evidence that:
There is considerable internal consistency in the ordinal ranking of health conditions across different well-being measures, with depression often ranking first in terms of impact;
(ii) Measures of overall well-being such as life satisfaction generate significantly smaller values of health compensation for the same health condition than measures of affective well-being such as an individual"s recent states of mental well-being, and measures of domain-specific well-being such as health satisfaction and self-assessed health compared to other people of the same age.
Background
Within the medical profession, the process of assigning monetary values to different health conditions is viewed as controversial and unethical in determining health care resource allocations. The idea that health conditions should be evaluated and ranked in terms of how much people are willing to pay in order to avoid them, or willing to pay for treatments to cure them, seems to contradict with what the central objective of health care 4 systems aim to achieve which is to grant all citizens access to health care irrespective of their ability to pay (Cutler, 2002; Smith & Richardson, 2005) . It also weighs heavily against the common (health care) perception that every human life should have equal values (Johansson-Stenman & Martinsson, 2008) . Such concerns are reflected in the UK"s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence"s (NICE) recommendations that health benefits are to be measured in terms of gains in quality adjusted life years (QALYs) rather than basing them on people"s willingness to pay (see, e.g., Rawlins & Culyer, 2004) .
Despite the controversy surrounding the methods used to attach monetary values to different health conditions, there appears to be an increasing tendency within the academic community to try and encourage health policy makers to value health directly in monetary terms (e.g., Diener et al., 1998; Klose, 1999; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Van Praag, 2002; Gyrd-Hansen, 2003; Mentzakis, 2011) . One of the main reasons for this is that monetary values of health enable direct comparisons between the relative benefits and costs of different treatments or interventions, thus making decisions about which conditions and treatments to prioritise more straightforward for policy makers compared with, for instance, cost-effectiveness analysis (Johannesson, 1995) or multiple criteria analysis (Devlin & Sussex, 2011) ..
There is apparently no clear consensus on what the best method of evaluation may be. At present, one of the most used approaches by economists is the revealed preference (RP) approach. Here, people"s revealed preferences or behaviours in the market are used to derive values for different health conditions, e.g., by analysing health risks people are willing to take in exchange for higher wages. 2 Despite its appeals -one being a clear objective indicator of individual"s health preferences -there are a number of empirical limitations to this RP approach. For instance, the RP method does not easily allow for generalisation across different cases of health conditions, and representative data can sometimes be very difficult to collect.
As a solution, the contingent valuation (CV) method, which is a survey-based hypothetical and direct method to elicit monetary valuations of effects of health technologies and conditions (see, e.g., O"Brien & Gafni, 1996 or Tsuchiya & Williams, 2001 ), had been adopted by economists as an alternative to the RP method.
3 By asking individuals to directly state their willingness to pay for medicines or treatments of an illness, or for inclusion of medicines or treatments in health insurance package, or on reimbursement list in case of a national health system, the CV approach allows for easy generalisation across different health conditions of interest, while it is also relatively inexpensive to collect CV data on a large scale (Donaldson et al., 1995; Liu et al., 2000; Amin & Khondoker, 2004; Pinto-Prades et al., 2009; Van der Star & Van den Berg, 2010) .
It is, however, well-known that the CV method is not without serious biases. First there is a substantial disparity between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept values in empirical studies (WTA). For example, it has been found that the WTA/WTP ratios vary from 2.5 to 2.9 (Brown, 2005) . Although a smaller difference has been reported in a health care application (Van den Berg et al., 2005) , this disparity puts a serious question mark on the validity of CV responses, given that such a difference cannot be explained by income effects alone (Hanemann, 1991) . This disparity suggests that the CV method suffers from several cognitive biases such as loss aversion, the endowment effect, and the focusing effect (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kartman et al., 1998) . For example, one of the explanations for WTP exceeding WTA for similar goods is the endowment effect.
The endowment effect is people"s tendency to value something more once ownership has already been established -simply because they tend to believe that the utility of a loss is greater than the utility of an equivalent gain (Kahneman et al., 1990) . Translated to the health framework, the compensation required for a health loss (WTA) tends to exceed the amount a person would be willing to pay for the equivalent health gain (O"Brien et al., 2002) .
More recently, a new approach -the WV method -has been proposed within the economics literature as an alternative for and complement to the RP and the CV methods.
The method can be used to determine monetary values of health conditions. It involves taking a randomly-selected representative sample of individuals and asks them to selfrate their experiences such as life satisfaction or moment-to-moment happiness levels.
Then it uses regression techniques to work out the implied "shadow price" of different types of health problems, i.e. the additional income (on top of the household income)
needed to be given to the individual to just compensate -no more, no less -for the wellbeing losses from acquiring a particular health condition. To put it in simpler terms, the WV approach allows the importance of different health losses to be studied empirically (ex post) rather than hypothetically (ex ante) by regressing a measure of well-being on different health conditions controlled for other personal characteristics. When income is also included in the regression and provided that the estimated coefficient on income enters positively and statistically significantly in the well-being equation, it is then possible to approximate trade-offs between income and each of the health conditions by estimating the increase in income that is required to offset a given health loss in the wellbeing measure.
There is a growing acceptance of the WV method in the economics literature. It has been used, for example, to calculate monetary valuations for many of the occurrences in life that have no obvious market values. This includes the values of marriage (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004) , the extent of social network (Powdthavee, 2008 ) and air quality (Luechinger, 2009) , as well as the costs of marital separation (Clark & Oswald, 2002) , crime (Powdthavee, 2005; Moore & Shepherd, 2006) , a natural disaster (Luechinger & Raschky, 2009 ), bereavements (Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008) , informal care (Van den Berg & Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2007) , terrorism (Frey et al., 2009) (2004, 2006) .
The main difference between the WV and the CV methods is that "utility" is conceptualized differently between the two approaches. 5 While the CV approach attempts to elicit people"s WTP through their stated preferences and based on their expected utility over different hypothetical situations, the WV approach argues that what really defines the impact of a health problem is not the expected utility. Rather, it is defined by the way people experience that particular condition in their lives (Kahneman et al., 1997; Dolan & Kahneman, 2008; Dolan et al., 2009 ). Therefore, a more direct measure of people"s experiences that does not explicitly draw people"s attention too much towards the impact of health condition in question is required to value the impact of health conditions in monetary terms.
6
While the debate on whether or not health should be valued by means of experienced utility is starting to take off in political discussions, one important question remains:
Which measure of well-being should we use to assess the monetary values of health conditions? Currently, there are many measures of subjective experience used as "proxy"
for utility in the economics literature. Yet there is no general consensus on the gold standard measure of experience, one which health practitioners can and should adopt when it comes to evaluating health in monetary terms. For example, while the most used measure of experienced utility in the WV approach is the life satisfaction scale (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; Van Praag & Baarsma, 2005; Van den Berg & Ferrer-iCarbonell, 2007; Powdthavee, 2008) , scholars have also used other measures of well-4 See Mentzakis (2010) for more recent estimates for the United Kingdom. The other paper that systematically examined the relationships between satisfaction levels and health problems for the United Kingdom is a paper by Groot (2000) . Groot (2000) did not derive monetary values of health but derived QALY values for various chronic conditions. 5 Van den Berg & Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2007) compared the WV method with the CV method and suggested that both methods yield similar results. However, their application of the CV method involved only marginal changes from the life experience under question (providing an extra hour of informal care) and it is therefore still an empirical question whether or not both methods will produce similar when valuing nonmarginal changes and in other applications like the valuation of health. 6 For a more detailed theoretical discussion of the WV method, see Kahneman et al. (1997) , Kahneman & Sugden (2005) , and Dolan & Kahneman (2008) .
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being such as the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) and health satisfaction (see, e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Van Praag, 2002; Clark & Oswald, 2002; Oswald & Powdthavee, 2008) . Others even used measures of attitudes towards the experience in question, i.e. fear of crime (Moore & Shepherd, 2006) . Could these different measures generate consistent monetary values for the same health conditions? Our hypothesis is that it is unlikely that the monetary valuations of health conditions will be consistent across all well-being measures for at least two reasons: (1) both valuation questions intend to measure at least partly different concepts, and (2) income has been found to correlate more with measures of cognitive well-being -such as life satisfaction -than measures of affects or moods -such as the GHQ-12 (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 2006) . In addition, Huppert and Whittington (2003) found that health and income may affect illbeing and well-being differently, considering that ill-being and well-being are two 
Data
The data set comes from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a nationally-representative sample of British households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals. The survey has been conducted between September and Christmas of each year from 1991 (Taylor et al., 2002) .
This paper draws on two survey questions on self-reported health problems in the BHPS.
The first set of questions asks each individual in every wave of the BHPS to state which (but not limited to one) of the following thirteen health conditions (problems, illnesses or disabilities) he or she has, excluding temporary conditions: Although self-reported, the checklist of these health conditions has been shown to correlate well with GP reports (Kriegsman et al., 1996) and the use of health and welfare services (Sacker et al., 2003) . People seem more likely to under-report their true health conditions in the absence of a list. There is also evidence that the inclusion of a checklist 10 of conditions in the survey encourages reporting of illnesses by the genuinely ill and not by those who are less severely affected by their disease (Knight et al., 2001 ).
The second set of questions asks individuals about their physical functioning: "Does your health in any way limit (a) your daily activities and (b) amount or type of work compared to most people your age?"
In terms of well-being, we use four measures of experience which were previously used or discussed in the well-being valuation literature: (a) overall life satisfaction, (b) the usual states of mental well-being, (c) health satisfaction, and (d) self-assessed health. The questions of the first three measures appear in the self-completion section of the questionnaire, whereas the question on self-assessed health is asked face-to-face by an interviewer. The order of appearance is that self-assessed health is asked first as part of the face-to-face interview, then the usual states of mental well-being, followed by health satisfaction, and finally overall life satisfaction. Apart from the health satisfaction and the life satisfaction questions which are placed close to each other, the others are allocated much further apart, with different types of other questions slotted in between.
Responses to the life satisfaction question are elicited using the following question: "All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life overall using a 1-7 scale? 1 = very dissatisfied, …, 7 = very satisfied". By definition, life satisfaction is constructed with an aim to elicit the respondent"s past, present, and future global wellbeing (Diener et al., 1985) . It has been shown in the literature to represent a measure of cognitive well-being as opposed to affect
The mental well-being score is derived from the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12)
score. The scale is considered by many medical scholars and other researchers as a good proxy for mental stress and strain (see, e.g., Guthrie et al., 1998) . Recent applications of GHQ include Clark & Oswald (2002) , Pevalin & Ermisch (2004) , Robinson et al. (2004) , Oswald & Powdthavee (2007) , and Powdthavee & Vignoles (2008) . Individuals indicate on a 4-point scale from 1 (no more than usual) to 4 (much more than usual) how often over the past few weeks they had lost sleep over worry, felt constantly under strain, felt they could not overcome difficulties, been feeling unhappy and depressed, been losing confidence, and been feeling like a worthless person. Individuals were also asked to indicate on a 4-point scale from 1 (better than usual) to 4 (much less than usual) on how often over the past few weeks that had felt that they were playing a useful part in things, felt capable of making decisions, been able to enjoy day-to-day activities, been able to concentrate, been able to face up to problems, and been feeling reasonably happy. We use the Likert score of GHQ, which is the summation of all the responses to the GHQ questions. This is the BHPS variable HLGHQ1, with a scale running from 0 (best mental well-being) to 36 (worst mental well-being). However, for simplicity, we have decided to reverse the original HLGHQ1 coding so that the value of 0 represents the worst mental well-being and 36 is the best mental well-being. Measures such as GHQ-12 are therefore considered to be a shorter-term measure of well-being, i.e. affects, compared to life satisfaction.
The health satisfaction question has the following wordings: "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your health overall using a 1-7 scale? 1 = very dissatisfied, …,
= very satisfied".
Finally, self-assessed health is one of the most often used survey question to measure health (see, e.g., Contoyannis et al, 2004 , or Powdthavee, 2009 
Empirical strategy
Assume, as in Blanchflower & Oswald (2004) , that there exists a generalized well-being function:
where W denotes individual"s well-being; the u(.) function is the respondent"s life experience or well-being and is observable only to the individual asked; h represents health stock; y denotes income; z is a set of socio-demographic and personal characteristics; and e is an error term that subsumes the inability of human beings to communicate accurately their levels of life experience. The well-being u(...) is assumed to be increasing in both h and y.
The monetary valuation of having a health condition on life experience or well-being can be determined by estimating the following empirical counterpart to equation (1) ,
where it W is the well-being score, i.e., 1-7 on the life satisfaction and the satisfaction with health scales, 0-36 on the mental well-being or the inverse-GHQ scale, or 1-5 on the self assessed health scale;
' it H contains a vector of health condition and problem dummies;
it Y is log of real equivalent household income (which is defined as the log of real household income/square of the number of people in the household); and ' it X are other standard controls in experience or well-being equations, including dummies for gender, age, agesquared, marital status, education dummies, employment dummies, number of dependent children, region and year (see, e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004) . In order to account for individual unobserved components, we also introduce individual random effects into the equation. Hence, the error term can be decomposed to the individual random effect component, 
Introduction of the mean variables helps to correct for the unobserved correlation between the individual random effects and the explanatory variables of interest (see Mundlak, 1978) . We can also interpret the addition of the mean variables as a way to decompose both health and income into a level and a shock effect. Equation (2) becomes
Here, the relevant income effects are given by:
The coefficient  is the shock effect and 
where SP is the calculated shadow price (or how much extra money is required to compensate an average person with a blood pressure problem), and y is the average level of real equivalent household income. Thus, an individual with a blood pressure problem, i.e. suggest that it makes virtually no difference to the trade-offs between estimated coefficients and to the statistical significance of the final outcomes whether one assumes 15 ordinality or cardinality in the experienced well-being data. Therefore, and for ease of interpretation, we adopt the same method as the previous studies aforementioned and estimate the models using only generalized least squares with random effects. 7 Table 2 reports the life satisfaction, mental well-being, health satisfaction, and self assessed health equations random effects estimates. As would be expected, the health problems enter each well-being equation in a negative manner. In terms of statistical significance, the models seem to produce qualitatively similar results. With respect to health shocks, only "epilepsy" is not statistically significant in life satisfaction or in mental health, but statistically significant in health satisfaction and self assessed health.
Results
However, it is not straightforward to compare the magnitudes of the coefficients across equations, because of the differences in scales across the four well-being measures.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to work out the internal rankings of the level effects of health problems and conditions ( θ β  ) and compare them across well-being measuresi.e. comparing the ordinal ranking of the size of the estimated dummy coefficients of health problems and conditions within each well-being regression equation. Table 3 gives the sum of the parameters required to calculate the shadow price of each health condition, i.e., equation (8) and Table 4 presents the internal rankings of these health problems for each well-being measure which are derived in Panel A of Table 3 .
Perhaps expectedly, "depression and anxiety" ranks very highly in all of the well-being equations, coming up first in two of the four well-being measures. This might support the thinking of a group of British researchers and policy-makers who have argued that the advanced societies should allocate substantially more resources to the treatment of depression (see, e.g., Bell et al. 2006; Dolan & Layard, 2011) . On the contrary, whilst there is a sizeable correlation between "alcohol or drug related problems" and both life satisfaction and mental well-being, the same health problem only ranks eleventh and eight in the health satisfaction and self assessed health equations. This implies that some health problems correlate more with overall well-being than with subjective health status.
It is also worth noting that "other health problems not listed" also ranks relatively high in all models, although we do not know what constitute these other health problems, i.e. we do not know whether they are mental or physical by nature.
Despite some notable differences, we find the correlations between how health impacts are ranked internally to be positive and sizeable across the different well-being measures.
For example, the lowest correlation coefficient is between mental well-being and selfassessed health (=0.632), whilst the highest correlation coefficient is between health satisfaction and self-assessed health (=0.979). The correlation coefficient between life satisfaction and mental well-being is approximately 0.8 (see the bottom of Table 4 ). This relatively stable internal ranking represents an important finding for health policy in that the various measures of life experience could all be used to derive a consistent ranking of the impacts of health conditions on people"s quality of life. This is primarily because the ability to produce a valid ordinal ranking of health problems could prove useful when it comes to making reimbursement decisions or compare performances in health policy.
Whilst consistency in the internal rankings across different well-being measures provides some comforts for the advocates of the WV approach, it is thought that the estimated monetary values of health will be even more appealing to policy makers as they would enable straightforward comparisons between costs and potential benefits of investments in health care. Table 5 To many, the in Table 5 reported SP values may be hard to grasp, as well as difficult to imagine them to be ever formally implemented in real life decision-making 8 often greater than what our annual income could buy us in terms of well-being. Moreover, it is worth noting that the calculated estimates according to the WV method are in contrast with the CV method not bounded by respondent"s income. 9 Our estimates obtained from running life satisfaction equations are generally larger than the ones obtained by Mentzakis (2011) . This is partly because income is entered in its natural log form in our study, whereas a linear form of income is assumed in Mentzakis" study. We prefer the log specification as it assumes decreasing marginal utility of income (see, e.g., also Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Van Praag, 2002) . Moreover, studies on the curvature of income in happiness equations have shown that happiness is better explained by log income than by its level (see, e.g., Layard et al., 2008) . Despite using a log specification of income, as did Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Van Praag (2002) , our estimates appear to be larger than their obtained estimates. As they combined life satisfaction data from Germany with health satisfaction data and data on health conditions from the United Kingdom and the United States, it is not straightforward their results with our results.
An additional question of interest is whether the calculated SPs vary significantly across different sub-groups of population. Though not presented here, our sub-sample regressions by gender and age group suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in the estimated SP values across sub-populations. The estimated SPs are generally larger for the same health problem and well-being measure for women than for men, and for younger cohorts (age  40 years old) than for older cohorts (40>age  65 years old). For instance, approximately £3,000 pa is required to compensate an average male for problems with arms, legs, hand, feet, back, etc. By contrast, the equivalent SP for women is £15,000 pa. A potential explanation for such differences is that the marginal utility of income is higher for men than for women and for older cohorts than for younger cohorts.
An alternative explanation is that the marginal disutility of health losses is higher for women than for men and for younger cohorts than for older cohorts.
Discussions and conclusions

A few questions suggest themselves.
First, what explains why such a significant difference in SP of the same health condition exists? One natural explanation for this is that there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of health problems across different well-being measures. Health conditions that are related to mental health appear to have large influences on (or rather significant correlations with) measures of overall well-being such as life satisfaction and mental well-being, whilst health conditions that are more physical and probably more salient to the health state of the individuals -e.g., "health limits daily activities", as well as "amount and type of work" -seem to have produced larger negative coefficients in both health satisfaction and self-assessed health equations. This suggests that when people are asked to evaluate their subjective health status, they tend to focus more on the physical conditions than on their mental state of health. By contrast, problems with mental health are probably built into people"s subjective evaluation of the overall quality of life such as life satisfaction and mental well-being. This is consistent with the theory on focusing effect, which states that people will often exaggerate the impact of any experience on their well-being, particularly if the question prompts them to do so (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998) . Given that physical health problems are easily observed and distinctively different to not having them, it is perhaps not surprising that more weights will be given to these conditions in the overall judgments of how healthy we feel compared with how we feel in general about our life. By contrast, money, which is normally less salient compared to other factors in our lives whenever we are asked to think about our overall life satisfaction, will be even less distinct and more likely to be excluded from the subjective assessments of health satisfaction and health compared to other people our age. The same may also apply to the current state of mental well-being when it is compared to how income normally enters life satisfaction equations (Kahneman et al., 2006) . In other words, this might explain why the ratios between the size of the income coefficients and that of the health problems may vary a great deal across measures of well-being. For instance, the estimated SPs obtained from the life satisfaction equation will tend to be small not because health problems have smaller impacts on the overall judgment of life satisfaction, but simply because of the denominator in equation (8) -i.e. the sum of the two income coefficients -is large. In short, given that SPs are income-dependent, it may be the case that the estimated health compensations will be overestimated -and often incomprehensively large -in health satisfaction, self-assessed health, and possibly the mental well-being equations, where the estimated income coefficients are relatively small in size, whilst maybe underestimated in the life satisfaction equation, where the size of the estimated income coefficients are relatively more sizeable. One could also argue that respondents to life satisfaction questions balance income with other aims in life and therefore life satisfaction is a better proxy for experienced utility compared with alternative experience measures.
The second, and more pragmatic, question is: If the WV approach is to be taken seriously by policy makers, which measure of well-being (or experienced utility, as defined by Kahneman et al., 1997) should one use? The results of this article suggest that if the ordinality of health impacts are the main variables of interest for health policy, it does not matter which well-being measure is adopted in the calculation of the ranking of health
impact. Yet if monetary valuations (or the cardinalization) of different health conditions is of policy interest, then it seems feasible and theoretically reasonable to argue for the adoption of life satisfaction as the main well-being measure to be used in the WV approach. This is because, apart from the SPs of depression and alcohol/drugs-related problems, the estimated figures for other health problems seem meaningful in practice and therefore feasible in the sense that one could imagine them being allocated to consumers in reality, e.g. £8,000 compensation for having heart/blood pressure problems per year. 10 Even more important, the theory behind life satisfaction is generally assessed by individuals as their "total" or global well-being which is theoretically and technically sound (Diener et al., 1985) , whilst other measures are either domain-specific (e.g., health satisfaction and self-assessed health) or elicit only a short-term affect which may fluctuate much more frequently than life satisfaction (e.g., GHQ-12).
The third question of interest is: are the estimated SPs subject to bias because of multicollinearity in the self-reported health conditions? There could, for example, be a potential problem of multicollinearity due to co-morbidity, i.e., older individuals may have reported to have two or more health conditions simultaneously. In addition to this, the correlation between shock and level effects of chronic health problems -e.g.,
"diabetes" and "epilepsy" -is also likely to be high for each individual. To address this problem, we present in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2 ) (i) the correlation matrix of the thirteen listed health conditions and (ii) the correlation coefficients between the shock and level effects of each health condition. Looking across the columns of Table A1 , the highest correlation coefficient is approximately 0.18, which comes from the relationship between "problems connected with: arms, legs, hand, feet, back, etc." and "heart/blood pressure or blood circulation problems". This implies is that there is unlikely to be a problem of multicollinearity across the different health conditions. However, according to Table A2 , it seems that many of the health conditions are highly persistent, i.e., the estimated correlation coefficients are no lower than 0.65. Nonetheless, it is only "diabetes" and "epilepsy" that have registered a correlation coefficient higher than 0.85, i.e., 0.887 and 0.916, respectively. This seems to suggest that while all SPs should be treated with care, these two chronic health conditions should be interpreted even more cautiously compared to the SPs of other health problems.
Like all other papers in social sciences, this article is not without limitations. One obvious and major criticism is that both income and health are endogenous in all of the estimated well-being regressions. While we could argue that the influences of the endogeneity bias on well-being estimates are probably the same across all experience measures, we realize that this is very unlikely to be true. Future research should therefore return to instrument for both health and income in each of the tested well-being equations. Moreover, given that the listed health conditions used in this study are self-reported, it is possible that our estimates will be biased from well-known "ordering" effects, i.e. the estimated health effects may vary according to the order of the survey questions (see, e.g., Stewart et al, 2002; Paloyo, 2009) , which implies that the SPs presented in this paper should be treated with care.
In conclusion, the relatively stable internal rankings across well-being measures suggests that the various measures of life experience could all be used to derive a consistent ordinal ranking of the impacts of health conditions on people"s quality of life -assuming that cardinalization is not of policy concern. This ability to produce a valid ordinal ranking of health conditions is an important policy implication from our results and could prove useful for agencies such as NICE. As soon as a cardinal comparison is necessary, economists often recommend monetary valuation methods.
Although the idea that health conditions could and should be monetarized is often viewed as deeply controversial by clinicians and health policy makers, a recent advancement in the well-being valuation literature has re-opened discussion among health economists about the monetary valuation of different health conditions. There has, however, been relatively little debate about which measure of life experience should preferably be used in the WV approach. This paper was written with an aim to fuel such a debate in mind. It 22 essentially suggested that we can often obtain different monetary valuations for the same health condition just by changing the dependent variable in the well-being equations.
Frequently, the monetary values of the same health condition are not just smaller, but incredibly smaller when life satisfaction is used instead of other more affective or domain-specific measures of well-being. Our results suggest that economists and policy makers may need to consider seriously about the distinct differences in the well-being construct before advising on which measure to be used in the WV approach, should it ever be implemented in real policy contexts to put a price tag on different health conditions. Note: +<10%; *<5%; **<1%. LS = life satisfaction (1 = very dissatisfied,..., 7 = very satisfied); IGHQ = inversed GHQ-12 or mental well-being (0 = lowest mental well-being, ..., 3 = highest mental well-being); HS = health satisfaction (1 = very dissatisfied,..., 7 = very satisfied); SAH = self-assessed health compared to other people of the same age group (1 = very poor health, ..., 5 = excellent health). Standard errors are in parentheses. All self-reported health problems are represented by dummy variables with a value of 1 if the respondent reported to have that particular health condition and 0 otherwise. Control variables include age, age-squared, gender, employment dummies, education dummies, marital status, number of dependent children, regional and wave fixed effects. 
